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Case Comments 589
construed as abrogating the rule only in a case of a single action ;
in a case of successive actions, the rule remains law.54 In the remaining
common law jurisdictions, the rule has not been abrogated in any
case.
(5) Are there relevant provisions lurking in the applicable Rules of Court?
I have made no attempt to investigate this question here.
The Tock Case
Peter W. Hogg*
TORTS-NUISANCE-DEFENCE OF STATUTORY AUTHORITY:
Tock v . St. John's Metropolitan Area Board.
In Tock v. St. John's Metropolitan Area Board,' the Supreme Court
of Canada had to decide whether the defence of statutory authority protected
a public body from tortious liability. The court was unanimous that, on
the facts of the case, the defence was not available. However, the court
split into three camps in its reasoning, and each camp was sharply critical
of the reasoning of the other two. No line of reasoning attracted a majority
of the sixjudge bench. The unfortunate result is that a well-settled body
of law has been thrown into confusion by the court's inability to produce
a majority ratio decidendi. My purpose in writing this comment is to argue
that the opinion that received the least support-that of Sopinka J., with
whom no one else agreed-is the one that is correct, both on principle
and on authority . For this reason, Sopinka J.'s judgment should be taken
as the only reliable guide to the future, despite the fact that the other
five judges all emphatically disagreed with him.
The facts of the Tock case were as follows. A storm sewer in the
city of St. John's, Newfoundland, became blocked. The back-up of water
flooded the basement of the house owned by Mr. and Mrs. Tock . The
sewer system was operated by the St . John's Metropolitan Area Board.
r . and Mrs. Tock sued the board for damages. The trial judge found
that there was no negligence on the part of the Board. The Board had
taken all reasonable precautions to keep the system flowing, and the blockage
could not be attributed to its fault. This finding was not challenged on
appeal .
54 Supra, the text accompanying footnotes 29-42.
* PeterW. Hogg, Q.C ., of Osgoode Hall LawSchool, York University, IDownsview, Ontario.
1 [1989] 2 S.C.R. 1181, (1989), 64 D.L.R. (4th) 620. The court was unanimous
in its result, but three different opinions were written: (1) by Wilson J., with the agreement
of Lamer and L'Heureux-Dubé JJ . ; (2) by La Forest J., with the agreement of Dickson
C.J.C . ; and (3) by Sopinka J. Only six judges participated in the decision, McIntyre J.
having retired during the ten-month period between argument and judgment .
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Negligence having been eliminated as a cause of action, the question
waswhether the Board was liable for nuisance. The flooding of the plaintiffs'
house would certainly qualify as a nuisance had it been caused by a private
person. The question was whether the Board was immunized from liability
by the fact that it was acting under statutory authority . The case thus
turned on the scope of the defence of statutory authority.
At trial, damages were awarded for nuisance.z The Newfoundland
Court of Appeal reversed this judgment. The Supreme Court of Canada
restored the trial judge's award of damages. The court was unanimous
in the outcome, but three concurring opinions were written, each proceeding
along quite different lines .
The Inevitable-Result Doctrine
Before Tock, the law respecting the defence of statutory authority
was reasonably clear, and, as I hope to demonstrate, reasonably satisfactory .
It was axiomatic, of course, that an act that was authorized by a statute
could not be a tort . The difficulty was to determine whether or not a
particular act was authorized by a statute. Where a public body had acted
in the purported exercise of a statutory power, its acts were not necessarily
immune from tortious liability . On the contrary, the rule was that the
statutory power had to be exercised, as far as possible, in conformity with
private rights . Only if the interference with private rights was unavoidable
would the statute be construed as authorizing the commission of what
would otherwise be a tort. An interference with private rights was said
to be unavoidable when the commission of a tort was "the inevitable
result" of the exercise of a statutory power.
The inevitable-result doctrine has provided the solution to many
different claims of nuisance against public bodies. In the leading case of
Metropolitan Asylum District v. Hill,3 it was held that a hospital board
was liable for a nuisance caused by one of its hospitals to adjoining residents .
The board had a statutory power to establish hospitals in metropolitan
areas, but the sites of the hospitals were left to the discretion of the board.
Since the board could have chosen a site more distant from residential
housing, it could not be said that the damage to the adjoining residents
was "the inevitable result" of the exercise of statutory power. Therefore,
the board could not rely on the defence of statutory authority, and the
plaintiffs recovered their damages.
z A cause of action in Rylands v . Fletcher (1868), L.R. 3 H.L. 330, was also accepted
by the trialjudge. The Supreme Court of Canada (like the Newfoundland Court of Appeal)
unanimously rejected this cause of action on the basis that the provision of storm sewers
was not a non-natural user of land ; supra, footnote 1, at pp. 1189 (S .C.R.), 637-639
(D.L.R.), per La Forest 3.
3 (1881), 6 App. Cas. 193 (H.L.) .
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A contrasting case is Allen v. Gulf Oil Refining,4 where it was held
that an oil refinery was not liable for the smell, noise and vibration that
its operations caused to adjoining residents . In that case, the oil company
had obtained the enactment of a private Act to acquire the land, and
the Act authorized the construction of an oil refinery on the land . Since
the statutory power stipulated the site upon which the refinery was to
be built, the House of Lords held that the Act immunized the oil company
from any nuisance caused by the smell, noise and vibration that would
be `tithe inevitable result of erecting a refinery upon the site . . .
How would the inevitable-result . doctrine apply to the facts of Tock?
In Tock, the Board had a statutory power to construct and operate a
sewerage system in the St . John's metropolitan area, but the statute was
expressed in perfectly general terms, saying nothing about the location
or size of the pipes or other details of the design or operation of the
system . In these respects, the statute was very similar to the statute in
êtropolitan Asylum District v. Hill. However, the Newfoundland Court
of Appeal decided that the inevitable result test was satisfied. In its view,
the finding that there was no negligence on the part of the Board meant
that the blockage and back-up were the inevitable result of the exercise
of the power to construct and operate a sewerage system .
In the Supreme Court of Canada, Sopinka .I. held that this absence-
of-negligence test was too low a standard for a finding of inevitable result .
The Board had to establish not only that it had not been negligent, but
also that there were no alternative methods of carrying out the work
(including more expensive methods) that would have prevented the damage.
®n the facts, that higher standard had not been met by the Board. It
followed that the Board could not rely on the defence of statutory authority,
and the plaintiffs were entitled to damages for the tort of nuisance .
For Sopinka J., the issue in Tock was the meaning of the inevitable-
result test . The test was settled, and all that remained to be determined
was whether a result that ensued without negligence was for that reason
an inevitable result. But Sopinka J. was alone in his reasoning . Wilson
and La Forest JJ. each wrote separate opinions rejecting the inevitable-
result test, and formulating and applying a new test . Fortunately for the
plaintiffs, these new tests produced the same result as Sopinka .I .'s reasoning,
so that the plaintiffs were able to hold their damages award. Unfortunately
for the defence of statutory authority, Wilson and La Forest J(PS reasons
were inconsistent with each other-indeed each was sharply critical of
the other-and neither set of reasons commanded majority approval . Two
judges (Lamer and L'11eureux-Dubs JJ.) aligned themselves with Wilson
Ji., and one judge (Dickson C.J.C .) with La Forest d.
4 [1931] A.C . 1001, [1931] 1 All ER 353 (H.L .) .
51bid., at pp . 1014 (A.C .), 358 (All E.1Z.) .
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La Forest J.'s reasons were the most radically reformist of the two
unorthodox opinions. He described the defence of statutory authority, at
least as hitherto applied by the courts, as "a legacy of the Victorian age" .6
He approved the suggestion that the costs of governmental action should
be absorbed by the public body rather than by the unfortunate individual
who happened to be injured.? In his view, instead of applying the inevitable-
result test, the court should simply ask "whether, given all the circumstances,
it is reasonable to refuse to compensate the aggrieved party for the damage
he has suffered".8 In this case, it was not reasonable to refuse to compensate
the plaintiffs for the damage caused by the flooding. The damage should
be "viewed as what it in fact is, a part of the overall cost of providing
a beneficial service to the community" .9 The Board was in a better position
to bear this cost, which could be spread among all ratepayers, than was
the "hapless victim".I° Therefore, La Forest J. concluded, the damages
award at trial should not be disturbed.
La Forest J. said that this approach "does not denude the defence
of statutory authority of all vigour".II By this he seemed to mean that
the existence of statutory authority would be a factor to be weighed by
the court in assessing whether or not it was reasonable to deny compensation .
He suggested that it would be reasonable to deny compensation for "ordinary
disturbances diffuse in their effect", but not reasonable to deny compensation
for "isolated and infrequent occurrences which inflict heavy material damage
on a single victim".I2 But he was frank to affirm that there was no "hard
and fast rule" . 13 The question was inherently discretionary, depending upon
thejudicialjudgment as to what was a reasonable result in the circumstances
of the case.
Wilson J. was very critical of La Forest J.'s reasonableness test . In
her view, "such a major departure from the current state of the law would
. . . require the intervention of the legislature". 14 She objected to "the high
degree of judicial subjectivity involved in its application",' S and its
consequent failure to provide guidance to public bodies or potential litigants.
As for La Forest J.'s suggestions as to how his reasonableness test might
work, they were "incompatible with the concept of principled decision-
6 Supra, footnote 1, at pp . 1193 (S .C .R .), 641 (D.L.R.) .
Ibid., at pp . 1194 (S.C.R .), 642 (D.L.R .) .
s Ibid., at pp . 1201 (S.C.R .), 647 (D.L.R .) .
9 Ibid., at pp . 1202 (S.C.R .), 648 (D.L.R .) .
10 Ibid.
1 I Ibid., at pp . 1201 (S .C .R .), 647 (D.L.R.).
12 Ibid., at pp. 1203 (S .C.R.), 648 (D.L.R.).
13 Ibid.
14 Ibid., at pp. 1204 (S.C.R.), 648 (D.L.R.).
15 Ibid., at pp. 1205 (S.C.R.), 648 (D.L.R.) .
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Making". 16 These are strong criticisms indeed, but in my respectful opinion
they are justified. The problem is that the idea of loss distribution, which
is La Forest d.'s policy justification for the new approach, is far too vague
and general to yield a rule that can be applied with any consistency .
The vagueness (I suppose I should say indeterminacy) of La Forest
J.'s reasonableness test is an obvious flaw in the new doctrine . But I would
offer the additional criticism that La Forest J. never spelled out what was
wrong with the outcomes yielded by the inevitable-result test, or how the
reasonableness test . would change those outcomes. Some demonstration
of this kind is surely necessary before a court (or legislature, for that matter)
should abandon a well-settled rule in favour of a new rule. La Forest
J.'s general idea seemed to be to widen the liability of public bodies for
serious individual losses, but the vagueness of the approach makes it hard
to be sure whether even this result would be achieved. In this particular
case, La Forest .I.'s approach yielded the same result as Sopinka J.'s
application of the inevitable-result rule . And the other examples offered
by La Forest .b . indicated that, in his mind at least, the results might not
be very different from those yielded by the inevitable-result rule.
Absolute Liability
16 Jbid.
17 Ibid., at pp . 1214 (S.C.R .), 629 (D.L.R.) .
1a Ibid.
19 Ibid., at pp. 1222 (S.C.R .), 634-635 (D.L.R.) .
ilson J., while emphatically rejecting La Forest J.'s approach, also
rejected the inevitable-result rule. In her view, the inevitable-result rule
applied only to those statutory powers that were specific as to the manner
or location of doing the thing authorized. Those statutory powers that
were framed in discretionary terms gave rise to absolute liability for any
tortious action taken under their authority . Where a public body had a
discretion as to the manner and location of doing the thing authorized,
the public body had to choose a manner and a location that would avoid
the commission of a tort-17 This was so, even if there was no manner
or location that would avoid the commission of a tort . In the case of
action taken under discretionary authority, the inevitable-result doctrine
"is no defence at all" . 1s
Wilson J. acknowledged that commentators and courts generally
disagreed with her, but she insisted that the reason for the inevitable-result
doctrine applied "only in cases where the public body has no choice as
to the way in which or the place where it engages in the nuisance-creating
activity" .19 In the present case, since the statute authorized the construction
and operation of a sewerage system, but did not specify how or where
it was to be done, the Board was obliged to construct and operate the
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system in strict conformity with private rights?° The defence of statutory
authority was not available, and the plaintiffs were entitled to recover
damages for their injury regardless of whether the Board could have avoided
their injury .
In my view, Wilson J.'s distinction is not a tenable one. It is true
thatin many casesMetropolitanAsylum District v. Hillis a good example-
where the public body has a discretion as to the manner and location
of constructing or operating the work, there is no reason to suppose that
the statute authorized the commission of a tort . The public body can,
and therefore must, exercise its power in a manner and at a location that
avoids interference with private rights . But it is easy to imagine a statute
that, while conferring a discretion as to manner and location, still cannot
be exercised without interfering with private rights . For example, the
construction of a subway system in a metropolitan area would inevitably
cause a nuisance to the residents of properties adjoining the selected route.
According to Wilson J., the defence of statutory authority wouldbe available
only if the legislation authorizing the construction of the subway stipulated
the route. Ifthe legislation left the selection of the route to a transit authority,
no defence would be available. But the nuisance to adjoining residents
is as inevitable in the latter case as in the former . Surely, the legislation
must be taken to authorize the commission of the nuisance in both cases.
Both La Forest and Sopinka JJ . were critical of Wilson J.'s rejection
of the defence of statutory authority for action taken under discretionary
powers . Sopinka J. pointed out that modern legislation authorizing the
provision of public works is usually broadly permissive?I Therefore, Wilson
J.'s approach would expose most public authorities to the same liability
as private enterprises. La Forest J. offered the example of a sewerage system.
On Wilson J.'s view, only if the legislature took the trouble of passing
a special enactment to authorize each sewer, would the defence of statutory
authority be available . If the legislature simply conferred a general power
to build sewers, the defence would not be available . But the reality is
that, no matter which form the authorizing statute takes, the sewers will
have to be built in similar locations, and they will create similar risks
to those who are served by them . The nature of the statutory authorization
"cannot, in all reason, have any bearing on the question whether com-
pensation is owed, or is not owed, for damage suffered as a consequence
of the operation of the sewer"?2
Rationale for the Defence of Statutory Authority
Implicit in the reasons ofboth La Forest and Wilson JJ. is an assumption
that the defence of statutory authority is often a technical obstacle to a
z° Ibid., at pp . 1223 (S .C.R .), 636 (D.L.R .) .
21 Ibid., at pp . 1224 (S .C.R .), 649 (D.L.R .) .
22 Ibid., at pp . 1198-1199 (S.C.R .), 645 (D.L.R .) .
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just result. It should, therefore, be no more than a factor in assessing
reasonableness (according to ha Forest d.), or should be available only
in those rare cases where powers are specifically limited to a particular
manner and location (according to Wilson J.) . But, in my view, it is a
fundamental principle of our law that an act that is authorized by statute
cannot be tortious . If every statute, regulation, by-law, order or official
act could give rise to tortious liability, the cost to government would be
overwhelming . This is not to say that those injured by some kinds of
authorized governmental action should always go uncompensated. Many
statutes do, and probably more should, provide for compensation for those
who have been injured by a governmental programme. But the design
of a compensation system has always been assumed to be a political question
to be decided by elected representatives rather than a justiciable question
to be decided by judges . There may be policy reasons for providing more
or less compensation than that which would be provided by the law of
torts. Those policy reasons would be related to the purpose, the efficacy
and the cost of the governmental programme. Issues of this kind are not
suitable for decision by judges . That is why the law of torts-the judicial
compensation system-should apply only when statutory authority has been
exceeded.
If, as I contend, the defence of statutory authority is one of the
fundamental rules of the common law, then it ought not to be lightly
displaced by alternative rules. In every case where it is alleged that a public
body has committed a tort, the first inquiry must be whether the act was
committed without statutory (or prerogative) authority? 3 That inquiry
involves the interpretation of the statute that confers authority on the public
body. If the statute explicitly authorizes the doing of the tortious act, then
obviously the act is authorized and the injured person has no remedy
in tort. If the statute implicitly authorizes the tortious act, the same result
must follow. The role of the inevitable-result rule is to determine when
a statute should be taken to authorize implicitly a tortious act. If the
commission of a tort is the inevitable result of exercising the statutory
power, then the statutory power must be taken to have authorized implicitly
the commission of the tort . In such a case, where the statutory power
cannot be exercised without interfering with private rights, the only
reasonable inference is that the statute has authorized the interference with
private rights .
What is wrong with this rule? To be sure, it allows a sphere ofimmunity
to public bodies. But, for the reasons given earlier, public bodies should
be immune from tortious liability when they exercise statutory powers.
In fact, as Sopinka .I . emphasized, the immunity is as narrow as it could
be while still respecting the authority of the legislature. If there is a way
of exercising the power without interfering with private rights, then the
23 See P.W. 11ogg, Liability of the Crown (2nd ed ., 1989), pp. 104-109 .
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immunity is lost. Obviously, the inevitable-result rule is exceedingly
respectful of private rights. Any larger recognition of private rights, as
suggested by La Forest and Wilson JJ ., moves the law of torts into the
sphere of authorized activity where in my view it has no place. I think,
therefore, that the inevitable-result rule strikes an appropriate balance
between the public and private interests that are in contention.
Conclusion
Before Tock, the defence of statutory authority was governed by a
relatively well settled rule of law: the defence was available to a public
body only when the commission of a tort was the inevitable result of
the exercise of statutory power. In Tock, two of the six judges rejected
the inevitable-result rule in favour of an entirely new defence of reason-
ableness. Three of the judges rejected the defence of statutory authority
altogether in the case of statutory powers that confer discretion as to the
manner of their exercise. Only one judge applied the inevitable-result rule .
The result is that five of the six judges rejected a fundamental rule
of the common law that has been well settled since the nineteenth century.
In my opinion, the reasons given for rejecting the inevitable-result rule
were unpersuasive, and each of the two replacement rules was inferior
to the inevitable-result rule . Moreover, neither replacement rule attracted
a majority of the court. Who can say what the law is now? It has been
thrown into confusion . In my opinion, the court should abandon these
doctrinal adventures, and reinstate the tried and true defence of statutory
authority, including the inevitable-result rule .
